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We explore a view of the crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that led to the collapse of a bubble
or pyramid scheme in financial markets. We embed this view in a standard model of the financial accelerator
and explore its empirical and policy implications. In particular, we show how the model can account
for: (i) a gradual and protracted expansionary phase followed by a sudden and sharp recession; (ii)
the connection (or lack of connection!) between financial and real economic activity and; (iii) a fast
and strong transmission of shocks across sectors and countries. We also use the model to explore the
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jventura@crei.catHistory shows that capitalist economies alternate expansions and recessions. Thus, even in
the heights of the expansion that went from the mid 1990s to the subprime mortgage crisis in
the summer of 2007 it was widely understood that a crisis would someday hit the world economy.
But nobody anticipated what has happened since. The depth of the current recession and the
blazing speed with which it has propagated across industries and countries far exceeds even the
most pessimistic scenarios. In fact, we need to go back to the Great Depression of the 1930s to
ﬁnd a crisis of a similar magnitude and global scope. It is still not clear however that the lessons
we learned from that earlier crisis are useful to understand what is going on today.
As everybody else, macroeconomists have been taken by surprise by the unfolding of events.
Even worse, providing an accurate diagnosis of the problem and coming up with clear-cut policy
prescriptions is turning out to be a really hard challenge. Part of the reason for this, of course, is
that the state-of-the-art macroeconomic models used for policy analysis are poorly adapted to this
task. These models typically emphasize nominal rigidities and labor market frictions, and downplay
t h er o l eo fﬁnancial frictions. As a profession, we mustg ob a c kt ot h ed r a w i n gb o a r da n dr e v e r s e
these priorities. To understand the current crisis we need models that bring back ﬁnancial frictions
to center stage.
Recent attempts to do this build on the seminal contributions by Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (2007) who developed models of the “ﬁnancial accelerator” mechanism.1
These models were designed to show how ﬁnancial frictions amplify the impact of traditional macro-
economic shocks through their eﬀects on net worth. The intuition is simple: the role of ﬁnancial
markets is to intermediate funds from those that have them (i.e. the savers or creditors) to those
who know what to do with them (i.e. the entrepreneurs or borrowers). This intermediation is useful
because it raises the average eﬃciency of the economy and thus the welfare of its inhabitants. To
be able to do this intermediation, savers need guarantees from entrepreneurs that the funds they
lend them (plus an attractive enough return!) will be paid back once the investments give their
fruits. The net worth of entrepreneurs, i.e. the amount of future funds that they can pledge today
to creditors, is akin to those guarantees. When net worth is low, entrepreneurs cannot borrow
enough and the economy operates at low levels of eﬃciency. When net worth is high, entrepreneurs
can borrow enough and the economy operates at high levels of eﬃciency.
1Of course, these initial models were quite stylized. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999)
developed more sophisticated versions for quantitative analysis. Recently, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Fernandez-
Villaverde and Ohanian (2010) have used versions of this model to study the current crisis.
1There are two alternative ways of using the ﬁnancial accelerator model to think about the current
crisis. The ﬁrst one is based on the notion that, as a result of unprecedented changes in the ﬁnancial
system, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism has become very powerful at amplifying traditional
macroeconomic shocks. Consequently, these shocks can now unleash massive contractions of credit
and deep recessions. The problem with this view, however, is that it seems diﬃcult to identify the
speciﬁc shock that has thrown the world economy into such a severe recession.
A second way of using the model is based on the notion that, instead of a traditional macroeco-
nomic shock, the world economy has suﬀered a large ﬁnancial shock that has drastically reduced
net worth. To articulate this view we need to develop a rigorous model of such shocks. This is
our main goal in writing these notes. We show how, in the ﬁnancial accelerator model, changes
in investor sentiment aﬀect the market valuation of ﬁrms and therefore their net worth. When
investors are optimistic, ﬁrm prices contain bubbles. These bubbles are useful because they raise
net worth, leading to a credit expansion and a boom. When investors become pessimistic, these
bubbles burst and net worth falls, leading to a credit contraction and a recession.
This shift in perspective is more than academic exercise. On the empirical side, introducing
bubbles in the model allows us to provide simple uniﬁed narrative of the main macroeconomic
developments of the recent past and the current crisis as a bubbly episode that started in the early
1990s and ended in 2007-08. Moreover, introducing bubbles also provides answers to two burning
questions for current macroeconomics: (i) Why do asset (stock, housing, ...) prices ﬂuctuate so
much and in ways that seem so unrelated to fundamentals? and (ii) How is it that the current
crisis has propagated so quickly and so strongly across sectors and countries?
On the policy side, modelling the crisis as the collapse of a bubble aﬀects the role of policy as a
stabilization tool. The case for a ﬁscal stimulus package and its optimal design depend crucially on
whether the shock that led to the crisis is a traditional macroeconomic shock or a shock to investor
sentiment. If the latter, we describe the type ﬁscal package that can get the world economy out of
the crisis. Whether this package is feasible, though, depends on the credibility of the government.
In thinking about the origin and consequences of the current crisis, there are diﬀerent, but
complementary, lines of research that can be pursued. One approach is to focus on the particular
details and institutional arrangements of ﬁnancial markets, emphasizing the role of speciﬁcf e a t u r e s
— like regulation or the incentives of certain market participants — in generating and fueling the
crisis.2 An alternative approach is to take a step back and think instead of the general features that
2For such an account, see Brunnermeier (2009).
2have characterized ﬁnancial markets, and generally macroeconomic performance, in recent years.
This approach, which we adopt in these notes, is also followed in recent papers by Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2009) and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008). As mentioned already, Gertler and
Kiyotaki draw on the insights of the ﬁnancial accelerator literature in order to interpret the current
crisis. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas instead relate the crisis to the “global imbalances” of recent
years and, in particular, to the prominent role of the United States as a provider of ﬁnancial assets
for the world economy. They argue that large capital ﬂows towards the United States led to the
creation of asset bubbles that eventually burst, giving rise to the subprime crisis.
Methodologically, we build on the traditional literature on rational bubbles that goes back to
Samuelson (1958). Tirole (1985) analyzed the conditions for the existence of such bubbles in the
context of a production economy. Our model is very close to Tirole’s with the diﬀerence that, in
our setup, the presence of ﬁnancial frictions implies that bubbles can be expansionary and increase
credit and output. This ﬁnding is related to recent results by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006),
Kraay and Ventura (2007), and Farhi and Tirole (2009). Our framework diﬀers from these last
papers in two crucial respects, though. The ﬁrst is that we study expansionary bubbles in the
context of a standard production economy. The second is that, as in Martin and Ventura (2010),
bubbles in our setting can arise even if all investments are dynamically eﬃcient in the economy’s
fundamental equilibrium.
These notes are organized as follows. Section 1 develops a stylized version of the ﬁnancial
accelerator model and explores the eﬀects of traditional macroeconomic shocks. Section 2 shows
that the model has additional equilibria with bubbly episodes and uses them to interpret the crisis.
Sections 3 and 4 extend the framework to study how bubbly episodes can lead to contagion, and
how policy can react to the bursting of a bubble. Section 5 concludes.
1 A canonical model of ﬁnancial frictions and business cycles
In a recent paper, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) develop a “canonical framework to help organize
thinking about credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current
crisis” (p.1). This framework is built around an agency cost that limits the ability of ﬁrms to pledge
future resources to their creditors. This section develops a stripped-down version of this framework
and uses it in the way that Gertler and Kiyotaki suggest.
31.1 Basic setup
Our model builds on Samuelson’s two-period overlapping-generations structure. The economy
contains an inﬁnite sequence of generations, indexed by  ∈ (−∞+∞).E a c hg e n e r a t i o nc o n t a i n s
a continuum of individuals of size one, indexed by  ∈ . Individuals maximize expected old-age
consumption, i.e.  =  {+1};w h e r e and +1 are the utility function when young and
the old-age consumption of individual  of generation .T oﬁnance their consumption, individuals
supply one unit of labor when young. Since individuals only care about old age consumption, they
save their entire labor income. Since individuals are risk-neutral, they always invest their savings
so as to maximize their expected return.
The economy also contains an inﬁnite sequence of generations of ﬁrms, indexed by  ∈ .T h e
set  contains all ﬁrms that were created, in period  or before and are still operating. Firms
produce output with a Cobb-Douglas technology:  ( )=1−
 · 
;w h e r e and  are the
labor and capital used by ﬁrm  in period . Firms also produce capital with a technology that
uses one unit of output in period  to produce  units of capital in period +1. The capital stock
of ﬁrm  e v o l v e sa sf o l l o w s :
+1 =  ·  +( 1− ) · ,( 1 )
where  is the investment of ﬁrm ,a n d ∈ [01] is the rate of depreciation. To motivate the
need for intermediation, we make two assumptions about the life cycle of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst one is
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 is the set of “new” ﬁrms in period ,i . e .t h es e to fﬁrms that are created in period  and
start producing output in period +1.W er e f e rt o as the investment eﬃciency and assume that
it ﬂuctuates randomly with   1. The second assumption is that only a subset 
 of generation
 is capable of starting a ﬁrm. We refer to this subset as the “entrepreneurs” and assume that it
has measure  ∈ [01]. Everybody can manage an old ﬁrm.
Workers and savings are allocated to ﬁrms in the labor and ﬁnancial markets. The labor market
is competitive and all workers and ﬁrms can trade in it with zero or negligible transaction costs.







· ,( 3 )
4where  is the wage rate per unit of labor. Since the aggregate supply of labor is one, market
clearing implies that:
 =( 1− ) · 
 ,( 4 )
where  ≡
R
∈  is the aggregate capital stock. Equation (3) is the labor demand of ﬁrm ,
which results from hiring labor until its marginal product equals the wage. Since all ﬁrms use the
same capital-labor ratio, this must be the aggregate one. Thus, Equation (4) says that the wage
equals the marginal product of labor evaluated at the aggregate capital-labor ratio.
We turn next to the key piece of the model, namely, the ﬁnancial market. This market consists
of a credit market where individuals lend to ﬁrms, and a stock market where individuals buy and
sell old ﬁrms. Both markets are competitive and all savers and ﬁrms can trade in them with zero
or negligible transaction costs. We introduce however an agency cost that limits the ability of ﬁrms
to obtain credit. In particular, we assume that ﬁrms can commit or pledge to their creditors only a
fraction  of their resources in period . We refer to  as the ﬁnancial friction and assume that it
ﬂuctuates randomly within the unit interval. We adopt the convention that, in period , individuals
know the realization of shocks with index  (i.e.  and ), but they do not know the realizations
of shocks with index  +1(i.e. +1 and +1). The resources of the ﬁrm in period  +1consist of
the revenue from sales net of labor costs, i.e.  (+1 +1)−+1 ·+1,p l u st h eﬁrm’s resale or
market value, i.e. +1.T h e r e f o r e ,w eh a v et h a ti ne a c hp o s s i b l es t a t eo fn a t u r ei np e r i o d +1
the following constraint holds:
+1 ·  ≤ +1 · [ (+1 +1) − +1 · +1 + +1],( 5 )
where  is the credit that ﬁrm  obtains in the credit market in period ,a n d+1 is the (gross)
ex-post return to loans. We allow +1 to be contingent on any variable which is known in period
 +1 ,a n dr e f e rt o+1, as the interest rate. The right-hand side of Equation (5) captures the
concept of net worth. That is, the amount of future resources that ﬁrms can use as a collateral to
obtain credit today. The shock  captures the quality of the legal system and other institutional
arrangements that support credit.
Maximization implies that non-entrepreneurs will lend and buy old ﬁrms simultaneously if and
5only if the expected return to owning an old ﬁrm equals the interest rate:3





+1 · [ ·  +( 1− ) · ] − +1 ·  + +1
ª
 +  − 
if  ∈ 
 .( 6 )
To compute the return to owning an old ﬁr m ,n o t et h a ti np e r i o d the owner must spend the
purchase price plus the cost of new capital minus credit. Then, in period +1the owner obtains the
revenue from sales net of labor and ﬁnancing costs plus the resale value of the ﬁrm. Maximization
also implies that entrepreneurs start new ﬁrms only if the expected return to doing so is not lower






+1 ·  ·  − +1 ·  + +1
ª
 − 
if  ∈ 
 .( 7 )
Unlike old ﬁrms, new ﬁrms start without capital and their owners, who are also their creators, do
not have to pay a price for them, i.e.  =  =0if  ∈ 
 .
The next step is to determine the interest rate and ﬁrm prices that clear the credit and stock
markets. We conjecture that
+1 =  · −1
+1 +1− ,( 8 )
 =( 1− ) · ,( 9 )
and then verify that this conjecture is indeed consistent with market clearing. Equation (8) says
that the interest rate equals the return to producing a unit of capital within an old ﬁrm. Equation
(9) says that the price of a ﬁrm equals the cost of replacing the capital that it owns. Ideally,
all investment should take place within new ﬁrms, as these have a technological advantage when
producing new capital. This is not possible however if the ﬁnancial friction is severe enough. The
conjecture in Equations (8) and (9) turns out to be correct if the equilibrium is ineﬃcient and some
investment is carried out within old ﬁrms.
At the proposed interest rate and ﬁrm prices, entrepreneurs strictly prefer to start new ﬁrms
than to lend or purchase old ﬁrms. Moreover, since the interest rate is below the return to investing
in new ﬁrms the owners of these ﬁrms ask for as much credit as possible. The optimal ﬁnancing
contract ensures that Equation (5) is binding in all states of nature. Adding these constraints
3H e r e ,w eh a v eu s e dt h a tE q u a t i o n s( 3 )a n d( 4 )i m p l yt h a t ( ) −  ·  =  · 
−1
 · .
6across states of nature, we ﬁnd that:4
 =
1
1 − +1 · 
· 
©
+1 ·  · 
ª
.( 1 0 )
Not surprisingly, credit increases with the wealth of entrepreneurs and their investment eﬃciency,
and decreases with the ﬁnancial friction.
At the proposed interest rate and ﬁrm prices, non-entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between lending
and purchasing old ﬁrms. If they choose the latter, they are also indiﬀerent regarding the amount
of investment and external ﬁnancing of their ﬁrms. As a group, non-entrepreneurs purchase the
stock of old ﬁrms, give credit to new ﬁrms and use any savings left to produce new capital within
their old ﬁrms. To verify that markets clear, we must check that this group has enough savings to
d oa l lo ft h i s :
(1 − ) ·  − 








 . We assume from now on that this condition holds and,
as a result, the conjectured interest rate and ﬁrm prices are veriﬁed.5




( − 1) · 
1 − +1 · 
¸
· (1 − ) · 
 .( 1 2 )
Equation (12) is the law of motion of the capital stock. The dynamics of this economy are akin
to those of a Solow model with shocks to the average eﬃciency of investment. From any initial
capital stock, the economy converges towards a steady state in which the capital stock ﬂuctuates
4Adding up Equation (5) across states of nature yields:






+1 ·  · ( + )++1

,
where we have used that: (i) Equations (3) and (4) imply that  ( )−· = ·
−1
 ·; and (ii) entrepreneurs
put all of their savings in the ﬁrm and Equations (1) and (2) then imply that +1 =  · ( + ).T o o b t a i n
Equation (10), we substitute in the conjectured interest rate and ﬁrm prices and solve for .
5This requires that:
1 − +1 ·  − 
1 − +1 · 
· (1 − ) · 

 ≥ (1 − ) · .
In terms of the primitives of the model, this implies that: (i) +1 ·   1 −  in all dates and states of nature,
and (ii)  is high enough. The ﬁrst restriction ensures that the credit constraint is tight enough so that, after giving
credit to new ﬁrms, non-entreprenurs still have some savings left in their hands. The second restriction ensures ﬁrm
prices are suﬃciently low so that these savings are suﬃcient to purchase the stock of old ﬁrms.
6Investment spending consists of the savings of the young minus their purchases of old ﬁrms, i.e.  −  =
(1 − ) · 

 − (1 − ) · .O ft h i st o t a l ,n e wﬁrms invest

1 − +1 · 
· (1 − ) · 

 with eﬃciency ,w h i l et h e
rest is invested by old ﬁrms with eﬃciency one.
7within a range which is deﬁned by the support of the shocks. These shocks might originate in the
investment technology ()o rt h eﬁnancial friction (), but have similar macroeconomic eﬀects as
they both work through the average eﬃciency of investment.
1.2 Looking to the crisis through the lens of the canonical model
We are ready to use the canonical model in the way that Gertler and Kiyotaki suggest, namely,
as a framework to help organize our thinking about the current crisis. The stylized facts are well
known, of course (see Figure 1). The world economy entered a long and steady expansion around
the mid 1990s, with increases in consumption and investment. The prices of stocks, real state
and other assets grew to unprecedented levels. Intermediation soared, while interest rates fell to
historical lows. This expansion lasted more than a decade, leading many to think that the business
cycle was over. This might have been too optimistic. But nobody anticipated what happened after
the summer of 2007: a sudden and sharp drop in stock and real state prices, a massive collapse in
intermediation and the worse ﬁnancial crisis since the Great Depression. Since then, investment
has come to a halt and the world economy has experienced negative growth. We are only now
starting to see the light at the end of the tunnel.
The key question, of course, is how did all this happen. Coming up with a convincing explanation
for such a sharp and unexpected change in economic outcomes is a fascinating academic challenge
with far reaching policy implications. At a deep level, explanations of the crisis fall into one of
two rough categories. The ﬁrst one includes explanations based on the notion that something
fundamental or technological has happened. These explanations emphasize aggregate resource
constraints and view the crisis as a negative shift of these constraints. A second set of explanations
start from the premise that nothing fundamental has changed, and that we are only witnessing a
massive coordination failure. This second set of explanations emphasize the role of expectations
and view the crisis as a negative shift in those.
The canonical model described above oﬀers two alternative, but complementary, explanations
of the crisis: a shock to the investment technology, ; and a shock to the ﬁnancial friction, .
Both of these shocks are fundamental or technological, although they originate in diﬀerent parts of
the economy: the corporate or the ﬁnancial sector, respectively. We consider each of them in turn.
Figure 2 shows the response of the economy to a transitory shock to the investment technology.7
7In particular, we assume that  =¯  if 0 ≤ and  =  for all 0 and  ≥ ,w i t h¯  . To allow for
a clean experiment, we assume that  =  for all , and that the economy was already in the steady state in period
8The diﬀerent panels plot the assumed path for the shock () and the responses of the capital stock
(), consumption (+1), the stock market (), the interest rate (+1) and intermediation
(
 ).8 All variables are shown as deviations from the steady state. The increase in  raises the
average eﬃciency of investment through two channels. For a given allocation of investment, new
ﬁrms become more eﬃcient at investing. In addition, their net worth increases, relaxing their credit
constraint and allowing them to do a larger share of the economy’s investment. The increase in
the average eﬃciency of investment shifts the law of motion of the capital stock upwards and the
economy starts transitioning towards a higher steady state. As this happens, the capital stock and
consumption increase. In the ﬁnancial market, the interest rate declines, while intermediation and
ﬁrm prices increase. When  goes back to its original level, all these changes unwind. The law of
motion of the capital stock goes back to its original shape and the capital stock starts declining.
Eventually, the economy goes back to its original steady state.
Figure 3 shows the response of the economy to a transitory shock to the ﬁnancial friction.9 We
have calibrated the shocks so that the quantitative eﬀect on the average eﬃciency of investment
is the same in Figures 2 and 3. The most remarkable aspect of Figure 3 is that it is almost a
carbon copy of Figure 2. The only diﬀerence between these ﬁg u r e si st h a tF i g u r e3s h o w sal a r g e r
increase in intermediation. The reason is that shocks to the ﬁnancial friction only aﬀect the average
eﬃciency of investment through one channel: the net worth of ﬁrms increases, relaxing their credit
constraint and improving the allocation of investment. This is why a shock to  requires a larger
increase in intermediation than a shock to  to obtain the same increase in the average eﬃciency
of investment. Since shocks to  and  are observationally equivalent from a macroeconomic
perspective, the only way to tell them apart would be to use microeconomic data to ﬁnd out
whether aggregate ﬂuctuations in the average eﬃciency of investment are due to ﬁrms being more
productive or having better access to credit.
The model is stylized and much work remains to be done to get it ready for serious quantitative
analysis. But Figures 2 and 3 already show that it is possible to write down a model based on
fundamental or technological shocks to the corporate (i.e. ) and/or the ﬁnancial sector (i.e. )
that delivers dynamics that are qualitatively consistent with the evidence. Moreover, the notion
 =0 .
8The response of output and wages mimics that of the capital stock.
9In particular, we assume that +1 = ¯  if 0 ≤ and +1 =  for all 0 and  ≥ ,w i t h¯  .T o
allow for a clean experiment, we assume that  =  for all , and that the economy was already in the steady state
in period  =0 .
9that it is a drop in aggregate net worth that has caused a collapse in intermediation is certainly
appealing as it conforms to the perceptions of many observers and market participants.
Despite these encouraging signs, we are skeptical that a research strategy based on technological
or fundamental shocks will eventually succeed at explaining the current crisis. A dramatic downturn
as the one suﬀered by the world economy can only be caused by an equally dramatic shock. But
we cannot see what is the speciﬁc technological shock that could have caused such a large change
in the investment opportunities faced by ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd it diﬃcult to see what is the speciﬁc
change in the institutional and/or technological framework of ﬁnancial markets that has so suddenly
left them so impaired to do their job. Neither the resources available for intermediation, nor the
technology used for it seems to have changed much. A successful explanation of the crisis should
tell us why we are producing less with unchanging resources.
Even before the current crisis, the large and unpredictable ﬂuctuations in the stock and housing
markets of recent years hardly mirrored the evolution of technological or fundamental shocks.10
A successful explanation of the macroeconomic events of the recent years should also tell us why
ﬁnancial and real activity are sometimes delinked, and consider the possibility that asset prices
move in ways that are unrelated to fundamentals.
So we need an explanation of (i) why asset prices move in ways that are unrelated to funda-
mentals, and (ii) how these movements in asset prices can lead to ﬂuctuations in production with
unchanged resources. The key point of these notes is that this does not require changing the model,
but only the way we look at it. We show this next.
2 Bubbles as pyramid schemes
What is the price of a ﬁrm? We showed that the canonical model has an equilibrium in which the
price of a ﬁrm equals the cost that it would take to replace the capital it owns. This price is often
referred to as the fundamental value of a ﬁrm, since it also equals the net present value of all the
output that the capital owned by the ﬁrm will ever produce. But the canonical model has many
other equilibria in which ﬁrm prices are above their fundamental value. It is customary to refer
to these equilibria as bubbly, since they capture the notion of ﬁrms being overvalued or having a
bubble. We use these equilibria to sketch an alternative explanation of the current crisis.
10Although the recent evolution of real state prices is perhaps too close to us to draw any deﬁnitive conclusions, the
stock price boom and bust of the late 1990s, which has been widely studied, seems hard to attribute to movements
in fundamentals. For a detailed discussion on this last point, see LeRoy (2004).
102.1 Setup with bubbles
We solve the model again, conjecturing that the interest rate is still given by Equation (8) but that
ﬁrm prices are now given by:
 =( 1− ) ·  + ,( 1 3 )
where  is the overvaluation or bubble in ﬁrm . The assumption that ﬁrm prices equal their
fundamental value can be expressed as the restriction that  =0for all  and . This restriction
cannot be justiﬁed on a priori grounds but there is always an equilibrium in which it is satisﬁed,
as we showed in the previous section. Equation (13) already points out to the ﬁrst macroeconomic
eﬀect of bubbles: since ﬁrm prices are high, the amount of savings devoted to purchase the stock
of old ﬁrms increases and this reduces the funds available for investment.
At the proposed interest rate and ﬁrm prices, entrepreneurs strictly prefer to start new ﬁrms
than to lend or purchase old ﬁrms and, just as before, they ask for as much credit as possible:
 =
1










.( 1 4 )
Equation (14) points out to the second macroeconomic eﬀect of bubbles: since future ﬁrm prices are
high, entrepreneurs are able to obtain more credit and this improves the allocation of investments.
Of course, not any stochastic process for  can be part of an equilibrium. Broadly speaking,
there are two restrictions or requirements that bubbles must satisfy. The ﬁrst one is that bubbles
should grow fast enough to be attractive. At the proposed interest rate and ﬁrm prices, non-




.( 1 5 )
Equation (15) says that the expected growth rate of bubbles must equal the interest rate. If the
growth rate of the bubble were less than the interest rate, owning ﬁrms with a bubble would
not be attractive. This cannot be an equilibrium. If the growth rate of the bubble exceeded the
interest rate, non-entrepreneurs would want to borrow to purchase bubbly ﬁrms. This cannot be
an equilibrium either. The requirement that all bubbles have the same expected growth rate does
not mean that all bubbles be correlated. We shall come back to this important point in section 3.
The second requirement for a bubble to be part of the equilibrium is that it should not grow
too fast. Otherwise, the aggregate bubble would eventually be too large for the young to be able to
11purchase it and markets would not clear. Knowing this, standard backward-induction arguments
would rule out the bubble today. To verify that markets clear, we must check that non-entrepreneurs
have enough savings to lend to entrepreneurs and purchase the stock of old ﬁrms. That, is, we
must check that Equation (11) holds. We keep assuming that this condition holds and, as a result,
the conjectured interest rate and ﬁrm prices are veriﬁed.11
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−1 . A comparison of Equations (12) and (16) shows
t h a t ,i np r i n c i p l e ,t h ee ﬀect of bubbles on capital accumulation is ambiguous. The last two terms of
Equation (16) shows that purchasing the existing bubble reduces capital accumulation by diverting
resources away from investment. Since only non-entrepreneurs purchase bubbly ﬁrms and their
investment eﬃciency is one, the existing bubble crowds out capital one to one. The second term
of Equation (16) shows that the expected bubble expands capital accumulation by relaxing credit
constraints, increasing intermediation and the average eﬃciency of investment. To understand this






which enables them to expand borrowing by a factor of
+1
1 − +1 · 
, and each unit borrowed
entails an eﬃciency gain of  − 1.
To complete the description of the dynamics of the economy, we need to determine the evolution











.( 1 7 )
That is, the aggregate bubble grows faster than the interest rate because of the creation of new
11This requires now that:
1 − +1 ·  − 
1 − +1 · 






























. The presence of bubbles makes the condition more stringent. Bubbles
raise both intermediation and the value of old ﬁrms, leaving less savings to produce capital within old ﬁrms.
12Investment spending consists of the savings of the young minus their purchases of old ﬁrms, i.e.  −  =
(1 − )·

 −(1 − )·−−

 . Of this total, new ﬁrms invest
1
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·
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with eﬃciency , while the rest is invested by old ﬁrms with eﬃciency one.
12ﬁrms and, with them, new bubbles too. Any sequence for   and 
 that satisﬁes Equations
(16) and (17) is an equilibrium, provided that Equation (11) holds in all dates and states of nature.
The dynamics of this economy depend on the dynamics of ﬁrm prices, and we turn to these next.
2.2 Bubbly episodes
Bubbly episodes can take place in the canonical model. Generically, the economy ﬂuctuates between
periods in which  = 
 =0and periods in which   0 and/or 
  0. We say that the economy
is in the fundamental state if  = 
 =0 . We say instead that the economy is experiencing a
bubbly episode if   0 and/or 
  0. A bubbly episode starts when the economy leaves the
fundamental state and ends the ﬁrst period in which the economy returns to the fundamental state.
Let  ∈ {} be a sunspot variable that determines the state of the economy. We refer to 
as investor sentiment. We deﬁne the transition probabilities as  =P r ( +1 =  | = ) and
 =P r( +1 =  | =  ). These transition probabilities could be a function of any endogenous
or exogenous variable of the model, and could ﬂuctuate randomly over time.
In the fundamental state, ﬁrm prices equal their fundamental values. Each period, there is some
probability that a bubble episode starts in the new generation of ﬁrms. When this happens, an
aggregate bubble appears and starts to grow according to Equation (17). This growth in the bubble
is due to two factors: (i) as the new ﬁrms become old, their bubble keeps growing at an expected
rate that equals the interest rate; and (ii) new bubbles appear in the successive generations of new
ﬁrms. Throughout the bubbly episode, there is some probability that the episode ends and the
economy reverts to the fundamental state. When this happens, all bubbles burst and ﬁrm prices
go back to their fundamental values.
It turns out that this simple model can give rise to a wide array of equilibrium dynamics with
bubbly episodes of diﬀerent sorts.13 To simplify the discussion, we consider next the simple example
in which the probability of an episode ending is constant, i.e.  = ; and the rate of bubbly creation
is also constant, i.e. 
 =   0 when the episode starts and then 
 =  ·  until the episode
ends, with 0.W ea l s oa s s u m et h a t is small, so that the fundamental state is similar to the
equilibrium of section 1. We use this example just for illustrative purposes. We also consider later
examples in which  varies during a bubbly episode.
To be able to graphically describe the dynamics of the bubble during an episode, we further
13See Martin and Ventura (2010) for a full analysis of the set of equilibria in a related model.
13simplify by assuming that there are no other type of shocks, i.e.  =  and  = .M o r e o v e r ,i f
the rate of depreciation is large, i.e.  ≈ 1,w ec a nm a k et h em o d e lr e c u r s i v et h r o u g has i m p l et r a n s -
formation of variables. Deﬁne  as the bubble’s share of wealth or savings, i.e.  ≡

(1 − ) · 

.
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,( 1 8 )
if +1 =  and +1 =0if +1 = . Naturally, the derivation of Equation (18) assumes that
Equation (11) holds. This condition can now be rewritten as follows:
 ≤
1 −  ·  − 
1 −  · ( − )
· (1 + )
−1 ≡ ¯ .( 1 9 )
The key observation is that the capital stock does not appear in Equations (18) and (19). Any path
for  that that satisﬁes Equations (18) and (19) in all dates and states of nature is an equilibrium
of the economy. Since  =0does this, we trivially have that such a path always exists. Of course,
the interesting question is whether more paths are possible and, if so, how do these paths look like.
Knowing this, we can then use Equation (16) to determine the associated paths for the capital
stock. This allows us to interpret bubbly episodes literally as shocks to the law of motion of the
Solow model.
Equations (18) and (19) embody the two requirements for bubbly episodes to be part of an
equilibrium, and that we mentioned earlier. The ﬁrst one is that the bubble must be expected
to grow fast enough. Otherwise, holding the bubble would not be attractive and nobody would
purchase it. This requirement is embodied in Equation (18), which is nothing but a restatement
of Equation (15). The second requirement is that the bubble cannot be expected to grow too fast.
Otherwise, it would eventually exceed available funds and it could not be purchased. Knowing
this, standard backward-induction arguments would rule out the bubble today. This requirement
is embodied in Equation (19) which is nothing but a restatement of Equation (11). Equations (18)
and (19) can be used to show that bubbly episodes can happen if  is suﬃciently low.
Within this example there are two types of bubbly episodes. The ﬁrst type is the conventional
or contractionary bubbly episode emphasized by Tirole (1985). These episodes occur in economies
14where investments are dynamically ineﬃcient, and they require that
( − 1) ·  · 
1 −  · 
 1.14 This
condition ensures that bubbles have a negative eﬀect on capital accumulation, as their negative
impact on investment spending is not compensated by the increase in the average eﬃciency of
investment. Bubbles raise the interest rate and reduce the capital stock. Figure 4 shows one of
these contractionary episodes. The solid line depicts Equation (18) and the dotted line depicts the
45 degree line. The initial bubble must be in the interval  ∈ [0 ∗]. After the initial bubble
appears, it declines as a share of wealth throughout. Only if the initial bubble is maximal, i.e.
 = ∗; this rate of decline becomes zero.
The second type of bubbly episode is the non-conventional or expansionary one analyzed by
Martin and Ventura (2010). These episodes arise in economies with ﬁnancial frictions, and exist
even if investments are dynamically eﬃcient. These episodes require that
( − 1) ·  · 
1 −  · 
 1.15
This condition ensures that bubbles have a positive eﬀect on capital accumulation, as their neg-
ative impact on investment spending is compensated by the increase in the average eﬃciency of
investment. These bubbles reduce the interest rate and increase the capital stock. Figure 5 shows
one of them. The initial bubble can be anywhere the interval  ∈ [0 ¯ ]. But these episodes now
look quite diﬀerent from the conventional ones. In particular, episodes might start with a small
bubble that gains momentum over time. These bubbles can become very large before suddenly
bursting.
We are ready to use these dynamics for ﬁrm prices to re-interpret the current crisis.
2.3 Looking to the crisis through the lens of the canonical model, again
The canonical model therefore oﬀers a third explanation of the crisis: a shock to investor senti-
ment. Since non-conventional or expansionary bubbles are the only ones that stand a chance to be
empirically relevant in the present situation, we focus on them in what follows. We would like to
emphasize that we are not changing the model of the economy, but only the way to use it. Rather
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15than looking for fundamental or technological explanations such as shocks to  and ,w ei n s t e a d
look for an explanation that relies on a coordination failure by focusing on a shock to .
Figure 6 shows the response of the economy to a shock to investor sentiment.16 Once again, the
diﬀerent panels plot the assumed path for the shock () and the responses of the capital stock (),
consumption (+1), the stock market (), the interest rate (+1) and intermediation (
 ). We
have calibrated the shock so that its eﬀects on the capital stock are roughly the same as those of
the technological shocks in Figures 2 and 3. The behavior of the diﬀerent macroeconomic variables
is similar to those in these previous ﬁgures. The main diﬀerence is that ﬁnancial variables tend to
ﬂuctuate much more in the case of a shock to . One reason is that the shock has a direct eﬀect
on ﬁrm prices that is absent in the case of shocks to  and/or . In addition, high asset prices
reduce investment spending and this requires even a larger increase in intermediation to generate
the same increase in the capital stock.
According this view, a bubbly episode is nothing but a macroeconomic pyramid scheme. The
start of a bubble generates a positive wealth shock which can literally be described as a transfer
from the future. This is a central feature of a pyramid scheme where the initiator claims that, by
making him/her a payment now, the other party earns the right to receive a payment from a third
person later. By successfully creating and selling a bubble, entrepreneurs assign themselves and sell
the “rights” to the savings of a generation living in the very far future or, to be more exact, living
at inﬁnity. This appropriation of rights is a pure windfall or wealth gain for the entrepreneurs.
This wealth shock generates an eﬃciency gain, as it helps overcome the negative eﬀects of the
ﬁnancial friction. The bubble increases the net worth of entrepreneurs and allows new ﬁrms to
obtain more credit and invest more. In a very real sense, the bubble is like the oil that greases
ﬁnancial markets. The rights to the future generated by the bubble provide the collateralizable
net worth that ﬁnancial markets need to work eﬃciently. The bubble thus results in an increased
average eﬃciency of investment. This is why the eﬀects of a shock to investor sentiment resemble
those of shocks to  and/or .
As a research strategy, viewing the current crisis as the bursting of a bubble seems to overcome
the shortcomings of alternatives that rely on technological shocks. In particular, it explains (i) why
asset prices move in ways that are unrelated to fundamentals; and (ii) why these movements in
16In particular, we assume that  =  if 0 ≤ and  =  for all 0 and  ≥ . To allow for a clean
experiment, we assume that  =  and  =  for all , and that the economy was already in the steady state in
period  =0 .
16asset prices can lead to ﬂuctuations in production with unchanged resources. An additional beneﬁt
of this view is that it allows us to better understand why shocks are propagated so quickly and so
strongly across industries and countries. We turn to this issue next.
3 Bubbles and contagion
It is common for expectations to experience large swings at the sector level: investors might, for
example, become optimistic regarding the evolution of the high-tech sector, or they might become
pessimistic regarding the prospects of the housing market. The eﬀects of these sector-level shocks
often spread throughout the whole economy, aﬀecting other sectors directly through goods and
factor markets but also indirectly through the market valuation of their ﬁrms. The same is true
at the international level, where country shocks often propagate across the global economy with
surprising speed and intensity: the recent crisis constitutes a case in point. To think about these
issues, we introduce a second sector to our framework.
3.1 Setup with two sectors
Assume now that consumption and investment are a composite good made with two intermediates
from diﬀerent sectors, indexed by  ∈ {},w h e r e stands for “dot-com” and  stands for
“housing”. Let  be the total amount of this composite or output produced in the world economy.






,w h e r e is the output of sector ,a n d0 is a constant. We use the
composite good as the numeraire.
Both sectors have many ﬁrms, indexed by  ∈ ,w h e r e ∈ {} and  ∪  ≡ .
Sectors diﬀer only in their factor intensities:  ( )=1−
 · 
 .W ea s s u m et h a t  ,
so that the dot-com sector is capital-intensive relative to the housing sector. Each sector contains
half of the entrepreneurs. Everybody can manage an old ﬁrm in either sector.
Adding a second sector does not aﬀect the labor market, as the wage is still given by Equation
(4), provided that we deﬁne  as the average share of labor, i.e.  ≡
 + 
2
. Once labor has
been allocated to both sectors, we can write sectorial productions as a function of the aggregate
capital stock:
 =  · 
 ,f o r  ∈ {},( 2 0 )
17where  is a sector-speciﬁc constant.17
We conjecture that the interest rate and ﬁrm prices are still given by Equations (8) and (13).
At these interest rate and ﬁrms prices, entrepreneurs in both sectors strictly prefer to start new
ﬁrms than to lend or purchase old ﬁrms. Also, they borrow as much as possible since the interest
rate lies below the return to investing in new ﬁrms. Hence, total borrowing by entrepreneurs in
























−1  for  ∈ {}.
At the proposed interest rate and ﬁrm prices, non-entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between pur-
chasing old ﬁrms in either sector, investing in them, and lending to entrepreneurs if Equation (15)
holds. To verify the conjectured interest rate and prices, we keep assuming that Equation (11)
holds.
We can now describe the dynamics of this economy. Aggregating Equation (1), the law of
motion of the aggregate capital stock  is still given by Equation (16). Equation (17) describing
the dynamics of the aggregate bubble still applies. But it is useful to disaggregate these dynamics















−1  for  ∈ {}. Any sequence for   and 
 for  ∈ {} that
satisﬁes Equations (16) and (22) is an equilibrium, provided that Equation (11) holds in all dates
and states of nature. We examine some of these equilibria next.
3.2 Bubbly episodes
We are now ready to explore the eﬀect of bubbles on the allocation of resources across sectors. To
do so, we focus on the type of bubbly episodes analyzed in Section 2.2, which entail a constant
rate of bubble creation  and a probability of bursting equal to , although we now assume that
 = () for  ∈ {},w i t h0
(·) ≤ 0, so that larger bubbles are more stable than smaller
17The appendix contains a derivation of the wage and the sectorial productions as functions of the aggregate capital
stock.
18ones.18 Once again, we simplify the analysis by assuming that  =  and  =  and  ≈ 1.
Using Equations (16) and (22) letting  and 
 denote the bubble of sector  as a share of
wages, i.e.  ≡

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,( 2 3 )
for  = . Equation (23) generalizes Equation (18) and illustrates how bubbly episodes in
diﬀerent sectors interact. If 0 is expansionary, it shifts the +1 mapping downwards. Intuitively,
expansionary bubbles lower the interest rate and thus the rate at which other bubbles must grow
in equilibrium. If instead 0 is contractionary, it shifts the +1 mapping upwards. Intuitively,
contractionary bubbles raise the interest rate and thus the rate at which other bubbles must grow
in equilibrium.
Naturally, the derivation of Equation (23) assumes that Equation (11) holds. This condition
can now be rewritten as follows:
X
∈{}
 · (1 + ) ≤
1 −  ·  − 
1 −  · ( − )
.( 2 4 )
The goal of this extension is to study how bubbles in diﬀerent sectors interact with each other.
Before doing this, however, we brieﬂyr e v i e wt h ee ﬀects of a single bubble in this two-sector economy.
Assume, for instance, that a bubbly episode starts in the dot-com sector.19 This has the usual
eﬀects: (i) it expands the net worth of new dot-com ﬁrms, enabling them to obtain more credit
and raising the average eﬃc i e n c yo fi n v e s t m e n t ;( i i )i tr a i s e st h ep r i c eo fo l dd o t - c o mﬁrms and this
diverts resources away from investment. The former dominates the latter if and only if
 · ( − 1) · 
1 −  · 
 1.( 2 5 )
18The only reason for introducing this modiﬁcation is to permit bubbles with diﬀerent expected growth rates.
19This requires  to evolve according to Equation (23) and to have a stationary value that satisﬁes Equation
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19In this case, the bubbly episode in the dot-com sector expands the aggregate capital stock and
output. As Equation (20) shows, this raises the output of both the dot-com and the housing
sector. Although the bubbly episode takes place at the sector level, the whole economy expands.
And, regardless of the sector in which the bubbly episode actually takes place, the capital-intensive
sector is the one to expand the most.
This example illustrates how, by raising the net worth of new ﬁrms in their sector, expansionary
bubbles free resources that are used to expand output throughout the economy. But bubbly episodes
can also aﬀect other sectors more directly through stock market prices in a way that resembles the
phenomenon commonly known as “contagion”. We now turn to this possibility.
3.3 Contagion
Consider ﬁrst the case in which bubbly episodes complement and reinforce one another, generating
what we label “positive contagion”. This type of contagion happens when the episodes in question
are of diﬀerent types. To see this, assume that there is an expansionary bubbly episode in the
dot-com sector and a contractionary one in the housing sector for which
 · ( − 1) · 
1 −  · 
 1.( 2 6 )
These two bubbles clearly have opposite eﬀects on the aggregate economy. But the interesting
thing is that they reinforce one another. From Equation (23), we can derive the stationary bubble
in sector  as a function of the bubble in sector 0 6= ,i . e .∗
() and ∗
 ().I f ,a sw eh a v e
assumed, the dot-com bubble is expansionary while the housing bubble is contractionary, it can
be veriﬁed that ∗
 is increasing in  while ∗
 is increasing in . The intuition behind this
result is quite straightforward. The total demand for bubbles comes from dynamically ineﬃcient
investments. Expansionary bubbles raise the capital stock, lowering the interest rate and extending
dynamic ineﬃciency. Conventional or contractionary bubbles instead lower the capital stock, raising
the interest rate and eliminating dynamically ineﬃcient investments. These two types of bubbles
thus oﬀset each other’s eﬀects and, in doing so, they complement and reinforce one another.
Figure 7 plots the dynamics of  and . The solid upward-sloping loci depict the stationary
bubbles in both sectors, ∗
() and ∗
(), and their intersection represents the bubbly steady-
20state of the model.20 The ﬁgure represents a dynamically eﬃcient economy in which contractionary
bubbles cannot exist on their own: this is why ∗
(0)  0. It also depicts combinations of  and
 that satisfy Equation (24).
Figure 7 can be used to analyze the interaction between these bubbly episodes. Consider that
there is initially a growing expansionary bubble in the dot-com sector, so that   ∗
(0).W h e n
bubble  appears in the housing sector, it contracts the output of both sectors. But it also
boosts the growth of , directly enhancing the productivity of the dot-com sector: hence, there is
positive contagion as the bubble “spreads” across sectors and exacerbates the overvaluation of ﬁrms
throughout the economy. The stable path in the ﬁgure illustrates the evolution of both bubbles in
this case. Of course, the opposite eﬀects are at play when a bubbly episode ends. Suppose that
investors become pessimistic regarding the evolution of the dot-com sector and the expansionary
bubble in the sector collapses. Then, output falls in both sectors. But the collapse also generates
contagion eﬀects and it spreads to the housing bubble, which must also contract. And if, as depicted
in the ﬁgure, the economy is dynamically eﬃcient in the fundamental state, the housing bubble
can no longer exist and it necessarily collapses as well.21 Like a stack of dominoes, the fall of one
bubble takes the other one with it.
It is also possible for bubbly episodes to substitute one another generating “negative contagion”.
This happens when these episodes are of the same type. To see this, assume that there is an
expansionary bubbly episode in the dot-com sector and an expansionary one in the housing sector
for which
 · ( − 1) · 
1 −  · 
 1.( 2 7 )
We can once more ﬁnd ∗
() and ∗
 () using Equation (23) and verify that, if both episodes
are expansionary, ∗
 is decreasing in  while ∗
 is decreasing in . Intuitively, expansionary
bubbles raise the capital stock and lower the interest rate, thereby decreasing the rate at which
other bubbles must grow in order to be attractive. Hence, when an expansionary bubble appears
in sector  ∈ {}, it decreases the growth rate — and thus the equilibrium size — of expansionary
bubbles in sector 0 6= .
Figure 8 below plots the dynamics of  and  in this case. The solid loci depict the stationary
bubbles in both sectors, ∗
() and ∗
(), so that their intersection represents the bubbly








21This is, once again, because conventional or contractionary bubbles can only arise in the presence of dynamic
ineﬃciency.
21steady-state of the model. Once again, the ﬁgure depicts only combinations of  and  that
satisfy Equation (24) and it assumes that there is a bubbly steady state within this range.
In this case, the dynamics of the economy are globally stable: regardless of the initial values of
 and , the economy converges to the steady state. As before, consider that there is initially
a growing expansionary bubble in the dot-com sector, so that   ∗
(0). When bubble 
appears in the housing sector, it expands the output of both sectors. But it also dampens the
growth rate of the dot-com bubble and decreases its stationary size relative to ∗
(0).I nt h i ss e n s e ,
there is negative contagion since the rise of the housing bubble partially crowds out the dot-com
bubble. Clearly, the opposite eﬀects follow the bursting of any of these bubbles. If investors become
pessimistic regarding the prospects of the dot-com sector, its bubble — and thus, the value of its
ﬁrms — collapses. But this collapse now feeds the housing bubble, which increases its growth rate
and its share in the portfolios of non-entrepreneurs. Once again, there is negative contagion as the
bubble shifts from one sector to the other.
Finally, we would like to note that the results in this section point towards interesting ap-
plications in international economics. We have referred throughout to an economy with multiple
sectors. But, with minor modiﬁcations, this same model can be used to analyze a world economy
composed of multiple countries. In the simplest of such worlds, each sector could be interpreted as
ad i ﬀerent country. This interpretation would be perfectly consistent with our analysis here under
the assumptions of: (i) international ﬁnancial integration, which guarantees that interest rates are
equalized across countries, and; (ii) international trade, which can be used to guarantee that wage
rates are also equalized across countries.22 In this case, the examples analyzed above could be
used to think about the speed and intensity with which bubbly episodes seem to spread across
countries.23
22A simple way of doing this is to assume the existence of a second layer of intermediate goods, that we call -
and -goods. A -good is an intermediate good that is produced with one unit of capital, whereas an -good is
produced with one unit of labor. In this case, trade in intermediates leads to factor-price equalization and all of our
results apply immediately.
23Or to study the connection between international capital ﬂows and bubbles. Ventura (2004) argues that restric-
tions to capital ﬂows fuel bubbles. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) argue that, due to their relatively low
level of ﬁnancial development (i.e. low ), fast-growing Asian economies supply savings but little intermediation to
the world economy. By doing so, they boost demand for assets in developed economies and relax the conditions for
the existence of asset bubbles.
224 Policy implications
We have modeled the crisis as a negative shock to net worth that led to a collapse of intermediation
and the average eﬃciency of investment. Is there anything that governments can do to reverse
such a situation? If the shock is fundamental or technological, the canonical model cannot provide
a meaningful answer to this question since it lacks a good description of the microeconomics of
productivity and the ﬁnancial friction. But if the shock is the bursting of a bubble, the canonical
model turns out to be quite useful for policy analysis. Keeping with the exploratory spirit of these
notes, we add a government to the framework developed above and draw some tentative results.
4.1 Setup with a government
Assume next that the world economy contains a government that gives subsidies to ﬁrms and
ﬁnances these subsidies by taxing individuals and issuing debt. Unlike much of the recent literature
on the crisis, we do not to give the government an advantage over the market as a lender. Instead, we
assume the government enforces payments due using the same legal system and related institutional
arrangements as the private sector.24 This implies that it is not possible to improve the allocation
of investments without raising the net worth of new ﬁrms.25 To save on notation, we return to the
one-sector model of sections 1 and 2.
Let  and  be the tax levied on individual  and the subsidy given to ﬁrm  in period .T h e
government borrows by issuing one-period bonds which yield a (gross) return equal to 
+1.A s
in the case of private debt, we allow this return to vary across states of nature. This could reﬂect
a contingent contractual rate, or the government’s failure to keep with its contractual obligations.
Let  b et h ep a y m e n t sm a d et od e b t h o l d e r si np e r i o d. Then, the government’s budget constraint
can be written as follows:
+1 = 
+1 · ( +  − ),( 2 8 )
where  ≡
R
∈  and  ≡
R
∈ . Equation (28) says that the government borrows to make
debt payments, i.e. ,a n dt oﬁnance the budget deﬁcit, i.e.  − .
24For instance, some of the policies advocated by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Curdia and Woodford (2010) are
based on the assumption that (at least, after the crisis) the government is better at lending than the private sector.
25Consider a proposal for the government to lend to new ﬁrms. Since the total amount of resources that the legal
system can extract from these ﬁrms is ﬁxed, any lending done by the the government uses up an equivalent amount
of net worth. If ﬁnanced by issuing debt and/or taxing non-entrepreneurs, government lending crowds out private
credit one-to-one. Even worse, if partly ﬁnanced by taxing entrepreneurs, government lending crowds out private
credit more than one-to-one. The reason is that taking away resources from entrepreneurs lowers the net worth of
their ﬁrms.
23The presence of the government has no eﬀect on technology, i.e. Equations (1) and (2); or the
functioning of the labor market, i.e. Equations (3) and (4). It does however aﬀect the ﬁnancial
market in three speciﬁc ways: (i) there is now an additional market for government debt; (ii) taxes
reduce the savings available to purchase ﬁnancial assets; and (iii) subsidies improve the balance
sheet of ﬁrms and therefore their net worth. This last eﬀect means that Equation (5) should be
replaced by the following one:
+1 ·  ≤ +1 · [ (+1 +1) − +1 · +1 +  + +1].( 2 9 )
Equation (29) recognizes that future subsidies also constitute a source of revenue for the ﬁrm. The
conditions for maximization also need to be modiﬁed as follows:
+1 = 





+1 · [ ·  +( 1− ) · ] − +1 ·  +  + +1
ª
 +  − 








+1 ·  ·  − +1 ·  +  + +1
ª
 − 
if  ∈ 
 .( 3 1 )
Equations (30) and (31) are natural generalizations of Equations (6) and (7). Equation (30) says
that maximization by entrepreneurs requires that the expected return to owning an old ﬁrm and
holding government debt must equal the interest rate. Equation (31) says that maximization by
entrepreneurs implies that starting new ﬁrms must yield a return that is at least as high as the
interest rate.
We conjecture that ﬁrm prices and the interest rate on private credit are still given by Equations
(13) and (8), respectively. In addition, we conjecture that the expected return on government debt
is given by:

+1 =  · −1
+1 +1− .( 3 2 )
Equation (32) says that government debt must oﬀer the same expected return as private credit.
This is a direct implication of risk neutrality.
At the proposed interest rate and ﬁrm prices, entrepreneurs strictly prefer to start new ﬁrms
than to lend or purchase old ﬁrms and, just as before, they ask for as much credit as possible:
 =
1










,( 3 3 )
where  are the taxes levied on the entrepreneur that starts and owns ﬁrm .I n t e r m e d i a t i o n
24decreases with taxes on entrepreneurs and increases with subsidies to new ﬁrms.
At the proposed interest rate and ﬁrm prices, non-entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent among lending
to new ﬁrms, buying government debt or purchasing old ﬁrms. If they choose the latter, they are
also indiﬀerent regarding the amount of investment and external ﬁnancing of their ﬁrms. As a
group, the non-entrepreneurs purchase the stock of old ﬁrms, give credit to new ﬁrms, buy the
government debt and use any savings left to produce new capital within their old ﬁrms. To verify
that markets clear, we must check now that:











 . We keep assuming that this condition holds and our conjecture is veriﬁed.26
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−1 . A comparison of Equations (16) and (35) shows that ﬁscal policy has two
eﬀects on capital accumulation. The ﬁrst one is the conventional crowding-out eﬀect, captured by
the last two terms of Equation (35). As the debt grows, it absorbs a larger fraction of the savings
of the young generation and this diverts resources away from capital accumulation. But there is
also a second eﬀect here that is due to the ﬁnancial friction and is captured by the second term of
Equation (16). Subsidies to new ﬁrms foster capital accumulation by relaxing credit constraints,
increasing intermediation and the average eﬃciency of investment. For the opposite reasons, taxes
to entrepreneurs reduce capital accumulation.
To complete the description of the dynamics of the economy, we still need Equation (17) de-
scribing the evolution of the aggregate bubble and, in addition, we need the following equation
26This requires now that:
1 − +1 ·  − 


































. Note that taxes on entrepreneurs relax this condition while debt and subsidies tighten it.
27Investment spending consists of the savings of the young minus their purchases of old ﬁrms and government debt,
i.e.  −  −  − ( +  − )=( 1− ) · 

 − (1 − ) ·  −  − 

 −  − . Of this total, new ﬁrms invest
1
1 − +1 · 
·





















with eﬃciency , while the rest is invested by
old ﬁrms with eﬃciency one.






· ( +  − ).( 3 6 )
Equation (36) follows from Equations (28) and (32). The equilibrium depends on the ﬁscal policy
adopted by the government. A ﬁscal policy is a feasible sequence for taxes and subsidies, i.e. 
and , and a return process 
+1 satisfying Equation (32). Once this policy has been speciﬁed,
any sequence for , ,  and 
 that satisﬁes Equations (17), (35) and (36) is an equilibrium,
provided that Equation (34) holds in all dates and states of nature. We show next how ﬁscal policy
works in some of these equilibria.
4.2 ‘Undoing’ the crisis?
Let us start with a disclaimer: we do not search for the optimal ﬁscal policy. Instead, we focus on the
more modest question of whether the government can use ﬁscal policy to reverse the situation and
bring the economy back to the pre-crisis path. This might be a desirable goal for most individuals,
but not necessarily for all as some might beneﬁt from the crisis. Moreover, the pre-crisis path might
not be the optimal path in any meaningful way. To determine the optimal path, we need to give
weights to the welfare of diﬀerent individuals by choosing a social welfare function. We do not do
this here.
The key observation is that the bubble implements a series of intragenerational and intergener-
ational transfers that the government can replicate with ﬁscal policy. In fact, Equations (17), (35)
and (36) provide a simple blueprint for ﬁscal policy to undo the crisis:
1. Set all ﬁscal variables equal to zero, i.e.  =  =  =0for all  ∈  and  ∈ , and use
Equations (17) and (35) to describe the desired bubbly equilibrium. Let ˆ 
 and ˆ  describe
this equilibrium.
2. Then, set the following targets for ﬁscal variables: (i)  =0for all  ∈ 
 ;( i i )
 = ˆ 
 −
 ;
and (iii)  = ˆ  − .
This simple algorithm describes the ﬁscal policy that replicates the desired bubbly equilibrium.
Since ˆ 
 and ˆ  are an equilibrium of the economy without ﬁscal policy, the proposed ﬁscal policy
is always feasible. Note however that this policy is not fully determined, since target (iii) can be
achieved through various combinations of taxes to non-entrepreneurs,  − 
 ; subsidies to old
26ﬁrms,  − 
 ; and returns to public debt 
+1. These alternatives have diﬀerent distributional
implications but the same implications for the path of debt and the capital stock.
We have now a blueprint to restore the pre-crisis path. Assume, for instance, that the economy
was close to the bubbly steady state in Figure 5 before the bursting of the bubble. In this steady










( − 1) · 
1 −  · 
¶
µ
( − 1) ·  · 
1 −  · 
− 1
¶
· (1 + )
· (1 − ) · 
 ,
and, of course, 
 =  · . When the bubble bursts, the government can restore the pre-crisis
path by issuing an amount of debt that replaces the bubble, and giving subsidies to new ﬁrms that
amount to a fraction  of this debt. If 1, the additional proceeds from borrowing can be used
to subsidize old ﬁrms.28 If 1, the government would have to raise taxes on non-entrepreneurs
to ﬁnance the subsidies.
Going beyond this simple example, the government can restore any desired bubbly equilibrium
by replacing the bubble with government debt and rolling it over until the bubble pops up again.
Then, the government lowers government debt by reducing subsidies and raising taxes. This simple
counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy stabilizes the economy when there are shocks to investor sentiment.
This result seems quite strong and should raise some suspicion. Can the government really
use ﬁscal policy to undo changes in investor sentiment? Or have we cheated somewhere along the
argument? The answer to both questions is partly aﬃrmative. A crucial implicit assumption is that
the government can commit to this type of ﬁscal policy. If this is the case, then the government
can undo changes in investor sentiment following the blueprint above. If the government cannot
commit, the question becomes much more complicated.
Assume the markets test the government, and refuse to buy the debt based on the belief that
the government will not pay it back. This makes it impossible for the proposed ﬁscal policy to
continue, lowering the net worth of new ﬁrms, reducing intermediation and the average eﬃciency
of investment. In a nutshell, this brings the crisis back. In such a scenario, will the government
pay back the debt? Or will the government instead default and validate the belief of the market?
Paying back the debt requires forfei t i n go np r o m i s e ds u b s i d i e st on e wﬁrms and taxing the young
28More realistically, they could be used to lower taxes. Here this is not possible because we have set taxes to zero
before the crisis. Adding government spending to the model would take us away from this artiﬁcial corner.
27to pay the debtholders. These measures would further reduce capital accumulation and make the
crisis even worse. Although we have not modelled government objectives, it seems reasonable to
think that the temptation to default would be high.
So where are we now? Can the government really undo the crisis with ﬁscal policy? If the
government has commitment, the answer is unambiguously aﬃrmative. If the government has no
commitment, it might still try. Whether it succeeds or not depends again on market expectations.
If the market is pessimistic, ﬁscal policy might be ineﬀective or, even worse, it might deepen the
crisis. In this case, ﬁscal policy transforms a severe ﬁnancial crisis into an even worse sovereign
debt crisis.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
These notes have explored a view of the current crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that led
to the collapse of a bubble or pyramid scheme in ﬁnancial markets. According to this view, asset
prices today depend on market expectations of future asset prices. When investor sentiment is
high, asset prices are high and this raises the net worth of ﬁrms, relaxing their credit constraints
and improving the allocation of investment. This fosters capital accumulation and consumption.
When investor sentiment is low, the opposite occurs: lower asset prices reduce the net worth of
ﬁrms, tightening their credit constraints and worsening the allocation of investment. This leads to
a reduction in credit, output and consumption.
As a research strategy, viewing the current crisis as the collapse of a bubble is more appealing
than alternatives that rely on fundamental or technological shocks. It provides a simple uniﬁed nar-
rative of the main macroeconomic developments of the recent past and the current crisis. Namely,
the crisis was caused by the collapse of a bubbly episode that had sustained a steady expansion in
net worth, output and consumption since the 1990s. This narrative is consistent with the fact that
the expansionary phase was gradual and protracted while the recessionary phase has been sudden
and sharp. It does nor require us to identify a large and negative fundamental or technological
shock to blame for the current state of the world economy. It can also account for the connection
(or lack of connection!) between ﬁnancial and real economic activity, and the speed and strength
with which the crisis has been transmitted across diﬀerent sectors or countries. Finally, it provides
us with a simple blueprint for the design of ﬁscal policies that ‘undo’ the crisis, although it also
highlights that these policies rely on government commitment for their success.
28The analytical framework developed in these notes allows us to think through various aspects
of the current crisis. But there are a couple of very important loose ends. The crisis has led
to a signiﬁcant increase in unemployment throughout the world. Our model, with ﬂexible wages
and a fully inelastic labor supply, has nothing to say about this. The crisis has also had a strong
international dimension to it, as it took place in a context of global imbalances and it has led to the
steepest fall of world trade in recorded history. Our model of the world economy is too rough and
simple to speak to these issues in a meaningful way. A satisfactory treatment of unemployment
and international trade requires a fully-ﬂedged multi-country model with realistic frictions in labor
markets. Building such a model should be the next step in this research program.
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316A p p e n d i x
This section derives the wage and the sectorial productions as a function of the aggregate stock
of capital. Let  =


denote the relative price of dot-com to housing at time .O n t h e
consumption side, the Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that in equilibrium: (i) expenditure in both
goods is equalized at all points in time, so that  =


, and; (ii) given that the price of the
composite good is normalized to one,  · (2 · )
1
2 · (2 · )
1
2 =1 .
































 = ,( 3 8 )
where  is the rental price of capital and we have assumed that factor prices are the same across sec-
tors, i.e. that there is perfect mobility of labor across sectors and that there are non-entrepreneurs
investing in both sectors. We can apply Shepard’s lemma and derive Equations (37) and (38) to
obtain factor demands. This delivers the following market-clearing conditions for capital and labor:














· ,( 3 9 )














· ,( 4 0 )
where  denotes the economy’s aggregate stock of capital. Using both equations jointly with the
consumption-side implications for  in (i) and (ii) above delivers the following expression for the
production of the composite good:







































Equation (41) thus shows how, despite the multi-sector structure of this model, output of the
composite good is a simple function of the economy’s aggregate capital stock. Note that, since
32Equation (41) has been derived under the assumption that the marginal product of labor is equalized
across sectors, it follows that the wage is still given by Equation (4).
To retrieve the sectorial productions, we ﬁrst use Equations (37)-(40) to express  in terms of
. Replacing this expression in Equation (41) yields Equation (20):
 =  · 
 ,f o r  ∈ {},













for  ∈ {}.
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